Our next case to review in terms of the right to film is Gericke v. Begin. On March 24, 2010, at approximately 11:30 p.m. in Weare, NH, the defendant, Carla Gericke, was following Tyler Hanslin in her car. Sergeant Kelley of the Weare Police Department pulled his cruiser behind Gericke’s vehicle and activated his emergency lights. Both Gericke and Hanslin pulled over and Sergeant Kelley parked his cruiser between the two. Kelley advised Gericke that she was not the one being detained and told her to move her car. Gericke moved her car to the adjacent Weare Middle School parking lot to wait for Hanslin.
Kelley approached Hanslin’s vehicle and Hanslin advised Kelley that he was carrying a firearm and was properly licensed. After parking her car in the lot, Gericke got out and approached the fence that separated the lot from the road. From there, she attempted to audio and video record the scene from approximately 30 feet away and announced that she was doing this. (It was later determined that despite her best efforts, Gericke was not actually able to record, but still pointed the camera as though she were doing so.) Gericke thereafter put the camera away and sat in her vehicle.
Officer Montplaisir arrived on scene and demanded to see where the camera was. Gericke refused to tell him. The officer requested her li-cense and registration. Again, Gericke refused. Gericke was subsequently arrested, her camera seized, and she was charged with disobeying a police officer, obstructing a government official, and unlawful interception of oral communications, the New Hampshire equivalent of a wire-tap charge under Massachusetts law. All charges were dismissed. Gericke filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights.
Like Glik, the First Circuit ruled that Gericke, and any citizen for that matter, has a clearly established presumptive right to videotape police activity in public. Most notably, the First Circuit provided that “reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be imposed when the circumstances justify them.” The Court explained that “such a restriction could take the form of a reasonable, contemporaneous order from a police officer, or a preexisting statute, ordinance, regulation, or other published restriction with a legitimate governmental purpose.” This language from the ruling is particularly important and should provide guidance to officers as to the appropriateness of such restrictions:
The circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly when the detained individual is armed, might justify a safety measure—for example, a command that bystanders disperse—that would incidentally impact an individual’s exercise of the First Amendment right to film. Such an order, even when directed at a person who is filming, may be appropriate for legitimate safety reasons. However, a police order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right to film police performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with their duties.